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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANNETTE K. BEARDALL 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 16994 
v. 
NEIL J. BEARDALL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and Defendant in this matter are a 
divorced couple, and this matter arose out of an Order to Show 
Cause brought by the Plaintiff regarding said divorce. The 
Plaintiff requested that the Defendant be required to pay certain 
sums of money that the Plaintiff claimed were owed under the 
provisions of the Divorce Decree. Specifically, that Defendant 
owed sums of money for payment of medical expenses, payment of 
insurance premiums and attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was found to be owing certain sums of money 
and was ordered to pay $285.88 for doctor bills and medical ex-
penses, $73.32 as reimbursement for prescription drugs, $700.00 as 
reimbursement for insurance premiums and $125.00 as attorney's fees 
for a total Judgment of $1,184.20. It is from the Judgment for 
$700.00 for insurance premiums and the Judgment for $125.00 in 
attorney's fees that the Defendant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment awarding 
$700.00 as reimbursement for insurance premiums and the Judg-
ment awarding $125.00 as attorney's fees. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Annette Knotts, hereinafter referred to as 
"Respondent", and Neil J. Beardall, hereinafter referred to 
as "Appellant", were married at ~·Jinnemucca, State of Nevada, 
on May 5, 1951. The marriage was dissolved by a Decree of 
Divorce entered on November 22, 1968 in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. The Decree 
awarded Respondent custody of two of the couple's four children: 
Lisa Ann, then age 8, and Sherrie Kim, then age 3. Appellant 
was awarded custody of Michael Gus, then age 13, and John Neil, 
then age 17, and was ordered to pay child support and medical 
and dental expenses for the two minor daughters. 
The payment of the medical and dental expenses for 
the two minor daughters has been a source of much contention 
between the parties. In November of 1975, the Appellant was 
ordered to show cause why he should not reimburse Respondent 
for monthly group health insurance premiums paid, in part, by 
Respondent on behalf of the two daughters. In a Judgment and 
Order dated November 19, 1975, the Fourth Judicial District 
Court ruled that the Divorce Decree did not require Appellant 
to provide medical insurance for the couple's two minor daughters 
and Appellant was found to be not liable for reimbursement of the 
premiums paid by Respondent. Judge J. Robert Bullock specifically 
stated that: "Defendant [is] not found responsible to provide 
medical insurance for the two minor daughters of the parties." 
-3-
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Despite this Order, the Resuondent continued the 
insurance coverage on her two daughters knowing full well that 
the Appellant was not liable and that she was voluntarily 
making unreimbursable payments for the continued coverage. 
On February 6, 1980, a hearing was held before the 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on Respondent's Order requiring Appellant to show cause 
why he had not paid Respondent's $3,395.24 in medical, hospital 
and dental expenses for the parties' two daughters. In his 
Judgment and Order of March 6, 1980, Judge Bullock found, on 
Stipulation of the parties, that Respondent had paid $285.88 fc 
doctor bills and $73.32 for prescription drugs beyond amounts 
collected by Respondent from medical and dental insurance, and 
ordered Appellant to reimburse Respondent in those amounts. 
Furthermore, Respondent once again asked for reimbursement of 
her payments on the group health insurance premiums. In regarc 
to these insurance premiums, Judge Bullock stated: " 
technically I could not award her a Judgment for the insurance 
premiums that she has paid under the terms of this Decree or aE 
it was amended, could I?" (T 15). Despite the fact that Judge 
Bullock recognized that he had, in 1975, ordered that the 
Appellant was not responsible to provide medical insurance, 
Judge Bullock found that group health insurance premiums paid 
by Respondent amounted to $700.00, and ordered Appellant to 
reimburse Respondent in that amount. Furthermore, Appellant 
was ordered to pay $125.00 in attorney's fees, for a total 
-4-
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Judgment against Appellant of $1,184.20. From the Judgment 
awarding $700.00 for reimbursement of insurance premiums and 
$125.00 for attorney's fees, Appellant has taken this appeal. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE ORDER OF MARCH 6, 1980 REQUIRING APPELLANT TO 
REIMBURSE RESPONDENT FOR $700.00 IN MEDICAL INSURANCE IS AN 
INVALID DE FACTO MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE INASMUCH 
AS THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. 
A Decree of Divorce may be modified as is equitable 
to provide for the support and maintenance of the parties. 
U.C.A. 30-3-5 (1953) clearly gives the Courts continuing 
jurisdiction to make any modifications needed as is reasonable 
and necessary. In the present case, a Divorce Decree was 
entered on the 22nd day of November, 1968, wherein the Appella1 
was "ordered to pay all medical and dental expense incurred fo: 
medical and dental care to the minor daughters of the parties.' 
This Decree was properly modified in part on the 19th day of 
November, 1975, by an Order of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, wherein the Appellant was "found not re-
sponsible to provide medical insurance for the two minor <laugh· 
of the parties." 
The Order of March 6, 1980 by the Court was an inval: 
modification of the Divorce Decree inasmuch as the Respondent 
failed to show a substantial change of circumstances. This 
Court has clearly stated the proposition that in order to ~ofic 
an existing Decree, the moving party must show a substantial 
change of circumstances. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 
1090, 1091 (Utah 1978); Smith v. Smith, 564 P.2d 307, (Utah 
1977); Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986 (1953). 
-6-
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If a showing of changed circumstances is not made, 
the decree cannot be modified and the matters previously 
litigated and incorporated therein cannot be collaterally 
attacked in light of the doctrine of res judicata. Kessimakis 
v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978); McLane v. 
McLane, 570 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1977). In the case of Searle 
Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), this Court 
identified the four requirements for the application of the 
doctrine of res judicata, 
"l. ·was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action 
in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted 
a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, 
fully and fairly litigated?" 
(588 P.2d at 691) 
This Court further stated that: 
"In general, a divorce decree, like other final judg-
ments, is conclusive as to parties a.nd their nrivies 
and operates as a bar to any subsequent action. In 
order for res judicata to apply, both suits must in-
volve the same parties or their privies and also the 
same cause of action; and this precludes the relitiga-
tion of all issues that could have been litigated as 
well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the 
prior action." 
(588 P.2d at 690) 
In this case, there was no finding of a substantial 
change of circtnnstances between November, 1975 and March, 1980 
to warrant a modification of the Decree that the Appellant is 
-7-
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not responsible for medical insurance for the two minor 
daughters. Furthermore, the Respondent made no showing of 
a substantial change in the circumstances so as to warrant 
a modification of the Divorce Decree. 
The two suits dated respectively November, 1975 
and March, 1980, involved the same parties and the same cause 
of action. The four requirements for applying the dictrine 
of res judicata have been clearly fulfilled. Inasmuch as 
the Respondent failed to show a substantial change of cir-
cumstances, the Order of November, 1975 should be res judicata 
on the issue of whether the Appellant is liable for the medica 
insurance premiums. 
-8-
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POINT II. THE ORDER OF MARCH 6, 1980, REQUIRING APPELLANT 
TO REIMBURSE RESPONDENT FOR $700.00 IN MEDICAL INSURANCE 
PREMIUMS IS AN INVALID DE FACTO MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE 
DECREE SINCE IT IS RETROACTIVE, NOT PROSPECTIVE, IN EFFECT. 
Even if there has been a showing of a substantial 
change in circumstances, which would justify a modification of 
the Decree, such a modification cannot be a~plied retroactively. 
In Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977), this Court 
affirmed the lower Court's dismissal of a Motion for retroactive 
support, stating: "In this jurisdiction, alimony and support 
payments become unalterable debts as they accrue; therefore, a 
periodic installment cannot be changed or modified after the 
installments have become due. II (561 P.2d at 1079). Also, see 
Whitaker v. l'lhitaker, 551 P.2d 226 (Utah 1976); Scott v. Scott, 
19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (1976). If the Respondent dis-
agreed with the November, 1975 Order that the Appellant was not 
liable for providing health insurance for the couple's two 
daughters, she should have filed an appeal with this Court. 
Instead, she incurred these insurance expenses voluntarily for 
a period of three years and now seeks reimbursement from the 
Appellant for an expense which the November, 1975 Order clearly 
identified as an item for which the Appellant was not liable. 
The trial Judge stated: 
"I'm no~ saying anything except that technically I 
couldn t award her a Judgment for the insurance 
premiums that she's paid under the terms of this 
Decree or as it was amended, could I?" (T. 15). 
-9-
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The Judge recognized that he could not make the 
modification apply retroactively, yet he still awarded judg-
ment against the Appellant in the sum of $700.00 as reimburse-
ment for insurance premiums. This Order is an invalid 
retroactive application of the modification. 
The $700.00 judgment for reimbursement for insurance 
premiums against the Appellant should be set aside in that 
there was no showing of changed circumstances by the Responden 
to justify modification, and, even if there were, the modifica 
tion cannot be applied retroactively. 
-10-
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POINT III. THE AlMRD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENT 
IN THE PRESENT CASE WAS IMPROPER. 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(l) and 
U.C.A. 30-3-5 (1953) allow an award of costs and attorney's 
fees to be made in domestic relations cases. In the recent 
case of Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979), this Court 
stated that the award of attorney's fees in a show cause hearing 
or divorce matter is within the sound discretion of the trial 
Court. However, in the most recent case of Kerr v. Kerr, #16495, 
P.2d (Utah 1980), this Court held that an award 
----
of attorney's fees must be based on evidence of need and 
reasonableness. This Court set forth that the evidence of need 
and reasonableness must be produced at the trial. 
In the case presently before the Court, as in the 
Kerr case, no evidence as to reasonableness of the attorney's 
fees or as to the need was presented. In fact, the contrary 
was shown. As is evidenced by the financial declaration re-
ceived in evidence by the trial Court, and the stipulated facts, 
the Appellant is in far worse financial condition than the 
Respondent. The award of attorney's fees, then, must be reversed 
on two counts. The first being that the Respondent failed to 
introduce any evidence that the amount awarded was reasonable 
under the circumstances. The second count is that there was no 
evidence whatsoever to support the finding by the trial Judge 
-11-
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that the Respondent should receive the attorney's fee because 
of her financial situation. The lack of evidence on both thes1 
counts clearly indicates that this Court should reverse the 
award of attorney's fees. 
B. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH IS UNRELATED TO THE 
OUTCOME OF THE LAWSUIT HAS A SIGNIFICANT CHILLING EFFECT ON THJ . 
PARTY'S FOURTEENTH AMElIDMENT RIGHTS TO ::>UE PROCESS. 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution guarantees a person the right to due process of the law 
This has been interpreted many times to include the right to a 
hearing. In the present situation, the Respondent asserted a 
claim against the Appellant. The Appellant felt that the cla~ 
was substantially in excess of any claims that Respondent may 
have had against him. As such, he felt it necessary to exerci 
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due urocess and requested a 
hearing. At that hearing, the Appellant asserted a good faith 
defense against the claims of the Respondent. In fact, he 
substantially prevailed in those claims against the Respondent 
As such, an award of attorney's fees in this case constitutes 
a punishment against the Appellant for exercising his right to 
due process. If this Court were to uphold the award of 
attorney's fees in this case, it would create an atmosphere 
whereby a person with a good faith defense may refrain from 
asserting that defense in fear of receiving a greater judgment 
for attorney's fees. 
-12-
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C. A~ AWARD OF ATTQ"Q_NEY' S FEES AGAINST A PARTY THAT 
IS IMPECUNIOUS UNDER U.C.A. 21-7-3, 4 (1953) EFFECTIVELY 
DENIES THAT PARTY HIS RIGHTS UNDER THAT STATUTE. 
U.C.A. 21-7-3 (1953) allows a party to declare that 
he is impecunious. Furthermore, U.C.A. 21-7-4 (1953) grants 
to a party who is impecunious access to the legal system 
without prejudice because of his financial condition. Public 
policy demands that all, even the poor, should have access to 
justice. The above-mentioned statutory pronouncements reflect 
this public policy by removing the cost barriers to the judicial 
system. The Affidavit required under the statute must show that 
the individual filing the .Affidavit meets two criteria. The 
first being that he/she is in fact impecunious. The second 
being that the individual, in good faith, believes that he/she 
is entitled to the relief sought. In the present case, there were 
no findings by the trial Judge that either the Defendant was 
not impecunious or that his defense was not in good faith. In 
fact, the defense must have been in good faith in that the 
amount received by the Resµondent was approximately one-third 
of the amount requested. That one-third, in fact, reflects the 
questionable $700.00 Judgment for reimbursement of insurance 
expenses. 
If an impecunious party knows that even if he presents 
a good faith defense and substantially prevails, a Judgment for 
attorney's fees will likely be entered a~ainst him, his access 
to the legal process is substantially threatened. In the present 
-13-
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case, the Appellant presented a good faith defense and 
substantially prevailed, but still a Judgment for attorney's 
fees was entered against him. Such an award of attorney's 
fees is contrary to public policy manifested by the legislativE 
enactment of U.C.A. 21-7-4 (1953). A better rule for the 
judiciary would be to award attorney's fees against impecuniou~: 
defendants only when they present a frivolous defense, without 
basis in fact or law, and that such a determination is made at ~ 
t 
the time of trial. 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
Prior to a divorce decree being properly modified, 
the party requesting such a modification must present evidence 
of a substantial change in circumstances. Unless the party does 
so, the doctrine of res judicata applies and the modification 
cannot be made. In this case, there was no evidence of a sub-
stantial change in circumstances; therefore, any modification 
was improper. 
Even if the Respondent in this case had presented 
evidence of a substantial change in circumstances, the case 
law is clear that a modification cannot be applied retroactively. 
The Respondent was requesting that the trial Court order the 
Appellant to reimburse her for medical insurance premiums. The 
trial Court, in an earlier ruling, stated that the Appellant 
was not required to pay said premiums. The de facto modifica-
tion made by the trial Court was, in effect, applied retroactively 
and was improper. 
While it is true that the trial Court has broad 
discretion in the awarding of attorney's fees, the award must 
be based on reasonableness and need. It is clear from the 
record in this case that the Respondent failed to introduce any 
evidence whatsoever, as to the reasonableness of the fee. The 
evidence of need shows that the Appellant is more in need 
financially than the Respondent. 
-15-
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A holding under the circumstances of this case, that 
the award of attorney's fees was proper, would have a significa1 
chilling effect on the Appellant's rights to due process. The 
Appellant also presented evidence that he was, in fact, impecun 
under the State Impecuniosity Statutes. As such, the award of 
attorney's fees in this case flies in the face of the public 
policy enunciated under the State Impecuniosity Statutes and mu 
be reversed. 
Wherefore, the Judgment awarding the Respondent $700. 
for reimbursement of insurance premiums and $125.00 for attorne 
fees, should hereby be reversed. 
DATED this /£ day of ~ 
/ 
, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By P. Gary Ferrero 
105 South 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Appellant 
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